The “New CADE”: Towards a Superintendence for Digital Competition in Brazil?

Has the Brazilian competition defense framework really failed to the point of requiring a profound structural reform? 

The Administrative Council for Economic Defense's (CADE) track record suggests the opposite. As CADE’s president stated, commenting on a recent interview about its antitrust enforcement in the digital era, "[t]his we already do, [and] we have done it very well. We have cases today that are considered references in the world".^[1] 

The General Superintendency has demonstrated capacity to act swiftly in various cases, imposing behavioral remedies that closely resemble the ex ante obligations proposed by Bill 4,675/2025. Some of these cases – such as the investigation^[2] and cease-and-desist agreement signed with Apple regarding the iOS ecosystem^[3] and the interim measure against Meta suspending WhatsApp's new AI terms^[4] – show that the current system is already functioning responsively to new and emerging challenges.

An Unprecedented Superintendency and the Breakdown of CADE's Institutional Logic

Bill 4,675/2025, inspired by the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) and United Kingdom’s Digital Markets Competition and Consumer Act (DMCCA), does not merely seek to impose new rules on companies providing digital services, it actually proposes the creation of a new institutional body within CADE that will reshape how the authority operates.

To understand the institutional changes proposed by the Bill, one must look at CADE's current structure, whose tripartite design is widely praised for its advanced system of checks and balances.^[6]

The Council is built upon three pillars: the Administrative Tribunal for Economic Defense, which is the collegiate body responsible for final adjudication and sanctions; the Department of Economic Studies (DEE), tasked with providing technical and economic support to the council's activities; and the General Superintendency (SG), which acts as its investigative arm and make merger control decisions , where daily investigative work is organized through eleven General Coordinations for Antitrust Analysis.

This clear separation between scientific, adjudicatory, and investigative functions guarantees impartiality and technical rigor to the Brazilian antitrust framework.^[6]

However, Bill 4,675/2025 introduces a highly questionable institutional change: the creation of the Digital Markets Superintendency (SMD), a parallel body to the SG, with an independent mandate and its own superintendent, who will be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

Although the SMD would be positioned hierarchically at the same level as the SG, it would not handle merger review or collusion concerns in so-called “digital markets” (competences that would remain with the SG). Its broad role is defined by the new regulatory functions proposed in the Bill, namely the designation of digital platforms as systemically relevant, determining and applying ex ante obligations of such players, and imposing administrative and incidental procedural sanctions in the event of non-compliance. 

The Superintendence will also be responsible for permanently monitoring the activities and commercial practices of agents operating in “digital markets,” and will have the same powers to request information as CADE’s General Superintendence - these powers and undertakings are significant and would raise the SMD to a prominent and politically-charged role.^[7]

A Brazilian Jabuticaba?

This internal division design finds no parallel in major jurisdictions around the world:^[6] 

• In the United Kingdom, the Digital Markets Unit (DMU) was internally structured as a directorate of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), directly subordinated to its Chief Executive; 

• In the European Union, the enforcement of digital rules occurs under the Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) of the European Commission; and 

• In Germany, the Bundeskartellamt uses its pre-existing institutional structure to deal with large platforms.

  
  

As properly pointed out by CADE's own presidency, the creation of an autonomous superintendency fits much more into the category of an institutional "jabuticaba" (a uniquely Brazilian invention) than an international best practice.^[1] Instead, the appropriate and reasonable design would be the creation of a specialized technical unit (for instance, a new General Coordination) allocated within the current SG.^[8]

By insisting on having two parallel investigative bodies, the Bill creates an imminent risk of overlapping mandates, inconsistent analyses and contradictory decisions. The mere legal caveat of restricting merger review and collusion concerns to the SG is absolutely insufficient to shield the antitrust system from these inevitable operational collisions.^[6]

Budgetary and Political Blind Spots

Beyond the legal uncertainty generated by the SMD's architecture, the proposal carries significant substantive concerns and severe blind spots. The Bill advances without any Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) to justify the viability of this new structure and it is entirely silent on government budgetary provisions or staffing plans.^[9]

This omission is particularly alarming given CADE’s current size and budget. According to CADE's 2024 Integrated Management Report, the agency "maintains a lean team, formed mainly by civil servants and public employees from other institutions, who represented 82% of the 326 civil servants working in the autarchy in 2024"^[10] Additionally, only 55% of this staff is dedicated to core activities, meaning that the current structure operates at its limit with roughly 180 employees.^[10]

CADE’s president was very outspoken in a recent interview stating that he “would not let [the Bill] pass” in its current format, mainly “because it creates an Executive-branch structure without budgetary provision, without a budgetary impact assessment”.^[1]

Imposing an autonomous structure under these conditions will inevitably force the reallocation of already scarce technical resources, which could dangerously weaken the Council’s capacity to investigate high-impact infractions, such as traditional cartels.

Moreover, the new architecture introduces a serious functional risk. It opens the door for two investigative heads within the same council to operate under divergent enforcement philosophies, which threatens to complicate institutional coordination rather than strengthen it.

According to CADE’s president, “the creation of a structure with a separate mandate may have been inspired by the European Commission, but the European Commission is not a competition authority; it is, in fact, a very political board”.^[1]

Reform or Refinement?

CADE's track record demonstrates that its current tools are far from exhausted. This is reinforced by the president’s own statement that CADE is already active in digital markets, with enforcement actions that are considered global references.

Therefore, while protecting competition and ensuring CADE has adequate tools is a valid debate, the proper response does not require a rushed and disruptive structural overhaul.

Ultimately, the Brazilian legislature must face a fundamental choice: institutional strengthening or reckless fragmentation. Bill 4,675/2025 claims to empower CADE, yet it proposes fracturing the Council’s main investigative body without a single budgetary provision, staffing plan or, notably, a regulatory impact assessment.

Instead of refining a system that is already proving its effectiveness vis-à-vis emerging challenges, the creation of this unprecedented institutional "jabuticaba" threatens to dismantle CADE's structural integrity. Under the premise of taming digital platforms and advancing national sovereignty, the government hasn’t answered what problem the legislation will fix while pushing a fragmented architecture that  ignores the Council's administrative reality.

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Notes and References

[1] SAID, Flávia. CADE President Questions the Creation of a Digital Markets Superintendency in Government Bill. Tribuna de Petrópolis and Estadão, February 24, 2026. Available at: https://tribunadepetropolis.com.br/noticias/presidente-do-cade-questiona-criacao-de-superintendencia-de-mercados-digitais-em-pl-do-governo/. 

[2] BRAZIL. Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE). SG orders the adoption of an interim measure against Apple. CADE, November 25, 2024. Available at: https://www.gov.br/cade/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/sg-determina-aplicacao-de-medida-preventiva-contra-a-apple. 

[3] BRAZIL. Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE). CCADE approves a cease-and-desist agreement (TCC) in the investigation of Apple’s practices in iOS. CADE, December 23, 2025. Available at: https://www.gov.br/cade/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/cade-forma-maioria-pela-homologacao-de-tcc-em-investigacao-sobre-praticas-da-apple-no-ios.

[4] BRAZIL. Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE). CADE opens an investigation against Meta and adopts an interim measure suspending WhatsApp’s new AI-related terms. CADE, January 12, 2026. Available at: https://www.gov.br/cade/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/cade-abre-inquerito-contra-meta-e-aplica-medida-preventiva-suspendendo-novos-termos-do-whatsapp-sobre-ia. 

[5] NETO, Dario Oliveira; RADIC, Lazar. Brazil's Digital Markets Bill: A DMA Throught the Back Door?. Truth on the Market, September 24, 2025. Available at: https://truthonthemarket.com/2025/09/24/brazils-digital-markets-bill-a-dma-through-the-back-door/. 

[6] The Article 14-B, paragraph 2, of the Bill explicitly mentions that SMD’s competences are narrow. BRAZIL. House of Representatives. Bill No. 4,675/2025. Amends Law No. 12,529 of November 30, 2011; provides for the designation of economic agents of systemic relevance in digital markets; establishes special obligations for such agents; and creates the Digital Markets Superintendence within the Administrative Council for Economic Defense. Available at: https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=2562481. 

[7] LEÃO NOGUEIRA, Diego. See the Plans of the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) to Oversee Big Tech Companies. Valor Econômico, June 24, 2025. Available at: https://valor.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2025/06/24/veja-os-planos-do-cade-para-cuidar-das-big-techs.ghtml. 

[8] ITS Rio. Foundations and Influences of the Digital Markets Regulation in Brazil. 2026. Available at: https://itsrio.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Relatorio-Decodificando-Ingles.pdf. 

[9] BRAZIL. Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE). Integrated Management Report 2024. Available at: https://cdn.cade.gov.br/Portal/acesso-a-informacao/Transparência%20e%20Prestação%20de%20Contas/2025/RIG%202024%20COMPLETO%202025.06.25.pdf.