Public debate has not yet fully assessed how these new rules might affect startups, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and growing domestic companies.

Unlike Europe, Brazil's digital economy is still in a phase of rapid expansion, characterized by a vibrant ecosystem of "unicorn" startups and the emergence of companies that achieve scale in a relatively short period. This underscores the central role this segment plays in the country's overall competitiveness.

The critical question remains: how can we ensure that new regulations do not discourage investment, experimentation, and the very business models that keep the Brazilian digital ecosystem alive?

The Bill (PL) does not define what a "digital market" actually is.

This raises several critical questions: Where does the digital realm begin and end? Does the regulation apply only to "born-digital" companies or to any business currently undergoing digitalization?

The Bill fails to clearly articulate how "digital" functions as a core regulatory criterion, which directly impacts the practical definition of the regulation's scope.

While the notion of "digital markets" reveals an intent to regulate large digital platforms, the Bill does not focus on digitalization itself—which is a national goal for both economic competitiveness and access to rights.

The Brazilian Bill draws inspiration from the European Union's DMA (Digital Markets Act) and the United Kingdom's DMCCA (Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act).

Both regulatory frameworks emerged in response to controversial concerns that traditional competition law was ill-equipped to handle the unique characteristics of so-called "digital markets."

Nevertheless, even after extensive debate and recent implementation, the European Union itself is already discussing adjustments to its digital frameworks, seeking to refine the instruments used to promote effective and balanced competition in these markets.

This raises an important question for Brazil: to what extent does Bill No. 4,675/2025 replicate the very same premises that are now being re-evaluated in other jurisdictions?

The Bill is moving forward without a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) that assesses its potential economic, competitive, and social effects.

Without estimates regarding costs, benefits, and the impact on innovation, the country runs the risk of adopting a regime whose practical consequences have not been measured.

The accelerated legislative process contrasts sharply with the more deliberative approaches adopted in the European Union and the United Kingdom, which included public consultations, technical studies, and extensive social dialogue.

In Brazil, the Bill is moving forward in a rushed manner. Why not promote impact studies and foster more space for discussion?

In the interest of regulatory agility, the Bill authorizes simplified procedures for designating entities subject to the new rules.

With a simple act from the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Justice, any company—whether a bank, a marketplace, or a pharmacy—could suddenly become subject to more restrictive competition rules.

This possibility turns the scope of the law into a "moving target," reducing predictability and increasing legal uncertainty.

As early as 2021, CADE published a comprehensive report on the various cases it analyzed involving digital platform markets.

Do the proposed new rules actually address the bottlenecks and areas for improvement already identified by CADE?

The antitrust authority is already "modern" and dynamic. By creating new rules, are we strengthening or stifling this evolution?

The Bill seeks to create a new Superintendency of Digital Markets within CADE. This structure would be distinct from the others, and its Superintendent would be appointed directly by the President of the Republic.

How will this Superintendency interact with CADE’s existing structure and ongoing cases? Furthermore, what is the risk of regulatory capture in a superintendency dedicated exclusively to digital markets?

The proposal establishes a preventive regime within CADE but fails to clarify how this mandate will interact with Anatel, ANPD, the Central Bank, CVM, or other regulators that already oversee highly digitalized sectors.

If digital markets span virtually the entire economy, how can we avoid overlapping rules, conflicting decisions, and uncertainty for both companies and consumers?

Without coordination, we run the risk of building a regulatory jigsaw puzzle where each authority acts in isolation, and no one ensures the coherence of the system as a whole.

A specific regime for digital markets requires specialized teams, continuous analysis, sophisticated technical monitoring, and stable resources.

Yet, no one has answered the simplest question: Is Brazil ready to implement and enforce all of this?

Without clarity regarding structure, personnel, and oversight mechanisms, we run the risk of passing a law that is too ambitious for the country's current capabilities—leading to ineffectiveness, inconsistent decisions, and a loss of regulatory credibility.